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UNUSUAL DEFERENCE
William W. Berry III*
Abstract
Three Eighth Amendment decisions—Harmelin v. Michigan, Pulley 
v. Harris, and McCleskey v. Kemp—have had enduring, and ultimately, 
cruel and unusual consequences on the administration of criminal justice 
in the United States. What links these cases is the same fundamental 
analytical misstep—the decision to ignore core constitutional principles 
and instead defer to state punishment practices. The confusion arises from 
the text of the Eighth Amendment where the Supreme Court has read the 
“cruel and unusual” punishment proscription to rest in part on 
majoritarian practices. This is a classical analytical mistake—while the 
Amendment might prohibit rare punishments, it does not make the 
corollary true—that all commonly used punishments must be 
constitutional.
The “unusual deference” to state punishment practices in light of this 
misconstruction of the text has opened the door to a proliferation of
punishments that are disproportionate, arbitrary, and discriminatory. As
such, this Article argues for a restoration of the Eighth Amendment from
its present impotence by reframing the concept of unusualness in 
accordance with the Court’s stated Eighth Amendment values and 
unlinking it from its deferential subservience to state legislative schemes.
Part I of this Article explains the genesis of the Court’s unusual 
deference. Part II of this Article explores the manifestations of unusual 
deference, examining the flaws in the evolving standards of decency, 
differentness deference, and the three most far-reaching examples of 
unusual deference—Harmelin, Pulley, and McCleskey. Finally, this
Article concludes in Part III by reimagining an Eighth Amendment free 
from the error of unusual deference and demonstrating how such an 
approach could begin to remedy the problem of mass incarceration.
                                                                                                                     
* Associate Professor of Law and Frank Montague, Jr. Professor of Legal Studies and 
Professionalism, University of Mississippi. The author would like to thank Jack Wade Nowlin,
Christopher Green, Michele Alexandre, Rick Bierschbach, Corinna Lain, Meghan Ryan, and 
Brendan Plant for their insights concerning preliminary discussions of this Article. The author 
would also like to thank Allison Bruff for her excellent research assistance.
1
Berry III: Unusual Deference
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
316 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................317
I. THE GENESIS OF UNUSUAL DEFERENCE .................................319
A. Selective Incorporation and State Deference .................319
B. The Furman Backlash.....................................................320
II. THE MANIFESTATIONS OF UNUSUAL DEFERENCE...................322
A. Adopting the Wrong Evolving Standards .......................322
1. Proportionality and Dignity—The Ignored
Standards .................................................................323
2. The Majoritarian Misstep ........................................324
3. Subjective Shortcomings.........................................325
B. Differentness Deference .................................................326
C. The Problem of Disproportionate
Sentences (Harmelin) .....................................................328
1. Harmelin v. Michigan .............................................328
2. The Consequences of Harmelin ..............................330
3. Considerations of Stare Decisis ..............................332
D. The Problem of Arbitrary Death Sentences (Pulley)......333
1. Pulley v. Harris .......................................................333
2. The Consequences of Pulley ...................................333
3. Considerations of Stare Decisis ..............................337
E. The Problem of Discriminatory Death
Sentences (McCleskey) ..................................................338
1. McCleskey v. Kemp .................................................338
2. The Consequences of McCleskey ............................340
3. Considerations of Stare Decisis ..............................341
III. REMEDYING UNUSUAL DEFERENCE .......................................342
A. The Basic Framework ....................................................342
1. Three Aspects: Type, Method, and Technique .......342
2. Individual Inquiry (Core Values and
Absolute Proportionality)........................................343
3. Systemic Inquiry (Comparative Proportionality
and Fairness) ...........................................................344
B. Some Applications of the Basic Principles.....................344
CONCLUSION.........................................................................................345
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss2/3
2018] UNUSUAL DEFERENCE 317
All men make mistakes, but a good man yields when he knows his course 
is wrong, and repairs the evil. The only crime is pride.
— Sophocles, Antigone
INTRODUCTION
The criminal justice system in the United States remains broken.1 Two 
central problems encapsulate the flawed system: (1) the conviction and 
punishment of innocent individuals,2 and (2) the excessive and arbitrary 
punishment of offenders that has resulted in a mass incarceration 
epidemic.3 This Article explores the latter problem from the perspective 
of a neglected safeguard—the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.
While there are certainly many causes of the excessive imprisonment 
of criminal offenders in the United States, the absence of any serious 
constitutional limitation on such practices certainly constitutes, at the 
very least, an important enabling factor.4 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court 
bears significant responsibility for the current epidemic by failing to 
apply the Eighth Amendment to excessive, arbitrary, and discriminatory 
criminal punishments.
Three Eighth Amendment decisions—Harmelin v. Michigan,5 Pulley 
v. Harris,6 and McCleskey v. Kemp7—have had enduring, and ultimately 
cruel and unusual consequences on the administration of criminal justice 
in the United States.8 Harmelin has allowed the proliferation of 
disproportionate non-capital sentences, including draconian mandatory 
                                                                                                                     
1. See generally Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.
iii, iii (2015) (noting that while many suggest the American criminal justice system benefits 
defendants, very few are acquitted).
2. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 222 (2011) (explaining that one fourth of all DNA exonerations 
involve cases as early as the 1990s); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of 
Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law 
and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 598, 611–12 (2005).
3. See CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., U.S.F. CTR. FOR LAW & GLOB. JUSTICE, CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 17–18 (2012), 
https://www.usfca.edu/sites/default/files/law/cruel-and-unusual.pdf.
4. See, e.g., William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptions: A Constitutional 
Framework for Curbing Mass Incarceration, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 69–70 (2015) [hereinafter 
Berry, Eighth Amendment Presumptions]; William W. Berry III, Implementing Just Mercy, 94 
TEX. L. REV. 332, 340–41 (2015) [hereinafter Berry, Implementing Just Mercy] (explaining that a 
major factor in excessive sentencing is the rise of the penal-populism movement).
5. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
6. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
7. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
8. Id. at 289; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965; Pulley, 465 U.S. at 43–44.
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sentences and excessive sentences for non-violent offenders.9 Pulley has 
allowed state supreme courts to abandon their responsibility for 
preventing the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty10 as promised in 
Gregg v. Georgia.11 Finally, McCleskey has allowed racial discrimination 
to persist for over twenty-five years in capital cases, and has provided a 
doctrinal basis for the Court’s unfortunate lethal injection 
jurisprudence.12
What links these cases is the same fundamental analytical misstep—
the decision to conflate core constitutional principles with state 
punishment practices. The confusion arises from the text of the Eighth 
Amendment where the Court has read the “cruel and unusual” 
punishment proscription to rest in part on majoritarian practices. This is 
a classical analytical mistake—while the Amendment might prohibit rare 
punishments, it does not make the corollary true—that all commonly used 
punishments must be constitutional.13 Seizing upon this idea, the Court 
has exercised wide deference toward state punishment practices.14
The “unusual deference” to state punishment practices in light of this 
misconstruction of the text has opened the door to a proliferation of 
punishments that are disproportionate, arbitrary, and discriminatory. As 
such, this Article argues for a restoration of the Eighth Amendment from 
its present impotence by reframing the concept of unusualness in 
accordance with the Court’s stated Eighth Amendment values and 
unlinking it from its deferential subservience to state legislative schemes. 
If the Court were to reverse the decisions of Harmelin, Pulley, and 
McCleskey, it would be taking a significant step in this remediation effort. 
Further, this Article shows how reversing these decisions would begin to 
remedy the problems of excessive, arbitrary, and discriminatory 
sentences. Ultimately, this Article demonstrates how the Eighth 
Amendment could serve as a powerful tool to fix a broken criminal justice 
system.
Part I of this Article explains the genesis of the Court’s unusual 
deference. Part II of this Article explores the manifestations of unusual 
                                                                                                                     
9. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961, 994, 996 (affirming LWOP sentence for first offense of 
possessing 672 grams of cocaine).
10. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 43–46, 54 (holding that the Eighth Amendment requirement of 
relative proportionality does not require any particular scheme of review).
11. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
12. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292–93 (holding that the death sentence did not violate the 
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments because petitioner failed to produce evidence of racial 
discrimination in his particular case).
13. As explained below, just because all states chose to adopt a brutal form of punishment—
like drawing and quartering murderers—such a punishment would not be constitutionally 
acceptable. See infra Part I.
14. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 359 (1972).
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deference, examining the flaws in the evolving standards of decency, 
differentness deference, and the three most far-reaching examples of 
unusual deference—Harmelin, Pulley, and McCleskey. Finally, this
Article concludes in Part III by reimagining an Eighth Amendment free 
from the error of unusual deference and demonstrating how such an 
approach could begin to remedy the problem of mass incarceration.
I. THE GENESIS OF UNUSUAL DEFERENCE
To understand the Court’s embrace of unusual deference under the 
Eighth Amendment, it is instructive to examine its origins through the 
selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights and the backlash to the 
Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia.15 These two beginnings set the 
stage for the manifestations of unusual deference detailed in Part II.
A. Selective Incorporation and State Deference
Even before the adoption of the Constitution, a fundamental question 
existed as to the proper relationship between state and federal 
governments.16 The initial experiment—the Articles of Confederation—
rested on a decentralized model with state power trumping federal power 
in most circumstances.17 The adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights started to move the needle in the direction of federal power, 
establishing the supremacy of the federal government.18 Over time, the 
Court made clear that the Bill of Rights incorporated limits on state 
power, not just federal power, albeit in a piecemeal fashion.19 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has found that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates 
almost all of the Bill of Rights such that it applies to the states, but has 
                                                                                                                     
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
16. See James Madison, Vices of Political System 8, in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 1780-
1781, at 345–46, 348–52 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachel eds., 1962) (discussing 
issues of early American federalism).
17. See Calvin H. Johnson, States Rights? What States’ Rights?: Implying Limitations on 
the Federal Government from the Overall Design, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 225, 231 (2009).
18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing [sic] in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”); Johnson, supra note 17, at 248 (“Under the Articles, the state 
governments had been supreme over the Congress . . . but when the ratification of the Constitution 
was completed, by the People, the state governments were made subject to the supremacy of the 
federal government.”).
19. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1157 (1991); Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on “Incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746, 746–47 (1965).
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done so one provision at a time.20 For instance, the Court did not hold 
that the Eighth Amendment applied to the states until its 1962 decision in 
Robinson v. California.21
Since the beginning, the Constitution and the Congress largely left the 
administration of criminal law to the states.22 Now, even after a century 
of proliferation of federal crimes in the areas of drugs, guns, and 
corporate crime, the states still impose a significant majority of criminal 
sentences in the United States.23
The combination of the Court’s selective interventions and the broad 
state oversight of criminal justice led some Justices to resolve that, where 
possible, the Court ought to defer to the states rather than rigorously 
applying the Constitution to its practices.24 Perhaps the most obvious 
example of this is Justice Harry Blackmun’s dissenting opinion25 in 
Furman v. Georgia.26 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun indicated that he 
was against the death penalty and would vote against it if he were a 
legislator.27 Nonetheless, he dissented from the Court’s decision to find 
the death penalty unconstitutional as applied, and explained that the Court 
should not interfere with the decisions of states concerning punishment 
of their criminal offenders.28
B. The Furman Backlash 
The Furman case, as well as its aftermath, provides further insight into 
the Court’s deference to state legislatures in its application of the Eighth 
Amendment. At the time, public opinion polls showed that just under 
                                                                                                                     
20. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 48, 59 (1947), overruled in part by Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664, 666 (1925); MICHAEL KENT 
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 5 (1986).
21. 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that punishing an individual for being an addict 
violated the Eighth Amendment).
22. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 512 (2001) (explaining how criminal law arose from a common law structure).
23. Rachel Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the 
States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 522 (2011).
24. Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal 
Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 252 (1958); Barkow, supra note 23, at 527.
25. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 410 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
26. 408 U.S. 238. 
27. Id. at 405, 406.
28. In Furman, Justice Blackmun was unwilling to apply the language of the Eighth 
Amendment to assess whether death was a cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 410. Justice 
Blackmun’s view is particularly ironic given he wrote Roe v. Wade a year after Furman, having 
no issue with the Court interpreting the meaning of the Constitution to find a substantive due 
process right to abortion, without any clear language as an anchor for doing so. Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 116, 154 (1973); see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. 
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 920 (1973).
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one-half of Americans supported the death penalty, and there had not 
been an execution in almost a decade.29 After the Court held in Furman
that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment as applied, the 
public backlash was significant, both in terms of opinion and legislative 
response.30 Thirty-five states passed new death penalty statutes within the 
four years following Furman, with commentators and the general public 
alike widely criticizing the Court for perceived overreaching.31
A mere four years later, the Court reinstated the death penalty when it 
upheld the capital statutes of Georgia, Texas, and Florida in 1976, based 
on safeguards adopted by the states to limit arbitrariness in capital 
sentencing.32 Nonetheless, over the next twenty years, the Court slowly 
but surely allowed states to water down and, in some instances, even 
completely ignore these safeguards.33
One reading of the Court’s jurisprudence over this time views the 
Court as following the will of the people in its cases.34 The Court’s 
decision to adopt a deference-based doctrinal approach to the Eighth 
Amendment fits within this narrative, with the Court choosing to follow 
                                                                                                                     
29. See Gallup Poll: Support for Death Penalty at Lowest Level Since 1972, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6589. There had not been an 
execution for five years prior to Furman. See 1967: Luis Monge, America’s Last Pre-Furman
Execution, EXECUTEDTODAY (June 2, 2012), http://www.executedtoday.com/2012/06/02/1967-
luis-monge-americas-last-pre-furman-execution/.
30. CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 65 (2016).
31. Id. at 219; see also Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 
46–49 (2007) (describing the strong response of states in opposition to the Furman decision).
32. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976).
33. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 
967, 980 (1994); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1994); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 
350, 373 (1993); Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 478 (1993); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
827 (1991); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 183 (1988); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 
U.S. 231, 246 (1988); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 
U.S. 162, 165 (1986); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 389 (1985); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 
U.S. 447, 466 (1984), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 1616 (2016); Pulley v. Harris, 465 
U.S. 37, 50–51 (1984); Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 86 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 
U.S. 939, 958 (1983); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 904 (1983), superseded by statute, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, as recognized in Slack v. Daniel, 529 
U.S. 473 (2000); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 
862, 890 (1983).
34. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 287 (2009); 
STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 30, at 218; James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The 
Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28 (2007).
7
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the lead of state legislatures rather than impose limits upon them.35
Certainly, the Court has displayed a general hesitancy in this area 
uncommon with other areas of the Bill of Rights. Perhaps the 
consequence of Furman was a shell-shocked and cautious Court, at least 
in terms of placing limits on cruel and unusual punishments.
II. THE MANIFESTATIONS OF UNUSUAL DEFERENCE
Without a doubt, the costs of the Court’s unusual deference have been 
significant for individual offenders. They have permitted a proliferation 
of disproportionate punishments, allowed continued arbitrariness in the 
imposition of the death penalty, and allowed discrimination to pervade 
state criminal justice systems. 
A. Adopting the Wrong Evolving Standards 
After Furman, the Court articulated its guiding framework for 
applying the Eighth Amendment in Coker v. Georgia,36 which considered 
whether the death penalty was a constitutional punishment for the offense 
of rape.37 Unlike other constitutional provisions in which the Court 
interpreted the applicable language as a limitation on the ability of the 
majority to place restrictions on the power of the minority, the Court 
looked to the majority practice as the basis for its decision.38
Relying on language from its decisions in Weems v. United States39
and Trop v. Dulles,40 the Court explained that the Eighth Amendment’s 
ban against cruel and unusual punishments was not static, but evolved 
over time.41 As such, the Court was to apply the “evolving standards of 
decency” as marked by the progress of a maturing society.42
                                                                                                                     
35. William W. Berry III, Evolved Standards, Evolving Justices, 96 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
36. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
37. Id. at 586, 592. The background to this case is important. At the time, Georgia was one 
of the only states executing criminal offenders for rape, and almost all of those who received the 
death penalty for rape in Georgia were African-American men accused of raping white women. 
Id. at 595–96; Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Rape, Race, and the Death Penalty in 
Georgia, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 658, 667 (1975); Berry, supra note 35.
38. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597. In cases involving the First, Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, the Court balances the imposition of the government against the rights of the 
minority accorded under the Bill of Rights.
39. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
40. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
41. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592, 596 n.10.
42. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. Despite Justice Antonin Scalia’s view to the contrary, there is 
clear evidence supporting the idea that the originalist understanding of the Eighth Amendment is 
that it was to evolve over time. See John Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The 
Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1815 (2008).
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1.  Proportionality and Dignity—The Ignored Standards
The question, though, was what would provide the content of this 
constitutional standard. As the Bill of Rights offers a protection of the 
rights of individuals against legislative overreach, one might begin with
an investigation into such rights in the context of the Eighth Amendment. 
Here, the Eighth Amendment should protect individual criminal 
offenders against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments by 
state and federal governments.
The content of this protection, at the time of Coker, could have 
stemmed from the Court’s decisions in Weems and Trop. In Weems, the 
Court found that the punishment of cadena temporal for fifteen years,
stemming from the falsification of documents, was unconstitutional 
under the Eighth Amendment; the Court explained that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibited disproportionate punishments—punishments 
excessive for the crime committed.43 Indeed, it found that the 
constitutional infirmity of the punishment at issue was that it was more 
severe than punishments imposed for much more serious crimes.44
In Trop, the Court further articulated some core Eighth Amendment 
principles. It explained that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”45 In addition, the 
Court stated that “[w]hile the State has the power to punish, the 
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits 
of civilized standards.”46 While opaque, this concept of dignity prohibited
the use of torture, at a minimum.47
At the very least, the Court’s reading of the Eighth Amendment could 
consist of two basic principles: (1) the punishment itself was 
proportionate to the crime committed, and (2) the punishment did not 
infringe on the dignity of the offender, particularly in the sense it imposed 
torture or other similar degrading punishments on the offender.
                                                                                                                     
43. The disproportionate nature of the punishment could be with reference to any of the 
four purposes of punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. See 
William W. Berry III, Separating Retribution from Proportionality: A Response to Stinneford, 97 
VA. L. REV. BRIEF 61, 66–67 (2011). But see John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 908 (2011).
44. Stinneford, supra note 43, at 971. 
45. Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth 
Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2129, 2141; see also William W. Berry III & Meghan J. Ryan, 
Cruel Techniques, Unusual Secrets, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 432 (2017) (discussing the Eighth 
Amendment dignity demand).
46. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
47. Ryan, supra note 45, at 2146. The Court had also previously indicated “[p]unishments 
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death” in upholding a death sentence. In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
9
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2.  The Majoritarian Misstep
In Coker, however, the Court only relied on Trop for the principle that 
the Eighth Amendment evolved over time. The substantive doctrine it 
created had two parts: an objective inquiry and a subjective inquiry.48
The objective inquiry examines the majority punishment practices 
with respect to the punishment in question.49 In other words, to determine 
the meaning of the Constitutional protection of individuals against 
tyrannical, majoritarian state legislative overreaching, the Court looks to 
the practices of the states themselves. Specifically, the Court engages in 
state-counting to determine whether a majority of jurisdictions use such 
a punishment.50 If most states do not, the Court will hold that the 
punishment violates the objective part of the evolving-standards-of-
decency test.51 By adopting this approach, the Court has thus infused the 
content of a counter-majoritarian standard with the majoritarian practice.
By definition, the first part of the evolving-standards-of-decency test 
defers to state legislatures. To understand why such an approach 
eviscerates the power of the Eighth Amendment, imagine that every state 
adopted the penalty of life without parole (LWOP) for failing to pay one’s 
taxes in a timely manner. Despite the clearly cruel and unusual nature of 
this punishment, it would satisfy the objective inquiry of the evolving-
standards-of-decency test because all states use the punishment. 
One rationale for adopting this test lies in the language of the 
Constitution. The Court has seized on this majoritarian approach through 
its application of the word “unusual.” The Court has defined “unusual” 
to mean “rare,” which means an approach not commonly used. Through 
the lens of this rationale, it seems to make sense for the Court to look to 
the majority practice to inform its definition of “unusual.”52
The corollary to that rationale also shows why this is a poor standard. 
If a few states offer a particular punishment that is actually more effective 
and humane than the majority of other states, it would not make that 
punishment unconstitutional.
Popularity cannot be the appropriate measure of disproportionality or 
excessiveness. The content of unusualness, if linked to majority practice, 
entirely undermines the idea of cruelty. The provision—cruel and 
                                                                                                                     
48. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 422 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 564 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315–16 (2002); Berry, supra note 35, at 19–
20.
51. Id.
52. Solitary confinement is a current example of this. The Editors, Solitary Confinement Is 
Cruel and Ineffective, SCI. AM. (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
solitary-confinement-cruel-ineffective-unusual/.
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unusual—cannot mean that cruelty is acceptable as long as it is 
widespread and common.53
There are three possible readings of the “and” in the phrase “cruel and 
unusual.” First, it could require punishments to be both cruel AND 
unusual.54 Second, it could mean that it prohibits cruel punishments and 
unusual punishments, meaning the “and” has a meaning of “or.”55
Finally, the phrase could be a hendiadys, where cruel and unusual are a 
unitary concept.56 In that reading, cruel and unusual constitutes one 
idea—cruel punishments are unusual in nature (assuming the Court is 
enforcing the Eighth Amendment), and unusual punishments are 
certainly cruel.57 The hendiadys understanding is the best reading of the 
conjunction in the Eighth Amendment. 
To support the objective aspect of the Court’s inquiry, and the 
proposition that it is improper to link the word “unusual” to majoritarian 
standards, the Court also drew on the concept of the evolving standards 
defined in Trop. Indeed, the idea of an evolving standard necessitates 
some test for determining the content of a changing standard. Given the 
Court’s hesitancy to impute normative content into the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court naturally chose to look to majority practice to
assess societal standards. 
3.  Subjective Shortcomings
The second part of the evolving-standards-of-decency test could, in 
theory, serve to partially remedy the Court’s analytical misstep of looking 
to majority trends as the basis for defining minority rights. In this part of 
the test, the Court articulates its own subjective judgment, “[bringing] to 
bear” its own views.58 The adopted method of the Court in this vein is to 
inquire whether any aspect of the punishment satisfies any of the 
purposes of punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or 
rehabilitation. If the punishment does not satisfy any of the purposes, then 
the subjective judgment of the Court is that the sentence is 
unconstitutional.
The problem with this application is that the subjective and objective 
judgments of the Court have never been different. In every case where
                                                                                                                     
53. But see Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit 
Only Punishments that Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 569 (2010) 
(arguing punishments must be both cruel and unusual).
54. See id. at 605.
55. See id.
56. Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary AND Proper” and “Cruel AND Unusual”: Hendiadys in 
the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 690 (2016). But see John F. Stinneford, The Original 
Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 468 n.167 (2017) (taking issue with Bray’s reading of 
cruel and unusual).
57. Ryan, supra note 53, at 605.
58. Id. at 597.
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the Court has concluded a majority of jurisdictions disfavor the 
application of a particular punishment in light of offender or offense 
characteristics, the Court has found that the punishment also lacks 
subjective justification.
Similarly, the Court has never found a punishment that has the 
objective support of a majority of jurisdictions subjectively 
unconstitutional. It is unclear what would happen if the objective and 
subjective indicia diverted. What seems to be clear is that the 
majoritarian-based objective requirement must be met in order for the 
Court to deem a punishment (or really the application of a punishment) 
cruel and unusual. Perhaps the subjective indicia exist only as a check on 
the overreach of the majority punishment practices, but in reality, it has 
never served as such.
Thus, the evolving-standards-of-decency paradigm adopted by 
members of the Court demonstrated a collective hesitancy to make 
normative determinations concerning the meaning of the cruel and 
unusual punishment proscription of the Eighth Amendment.
B. Differentness Deference
Another doctrinal manifestation of the deference the Court adopted at 
the time of Furman is worth noting—the concept of differentness. In 
Furman, Justice William Brennan first articulated the idea that “death is 
different,” meaning that the death penalty’s uniqueness entitles it to a 
higher degree of constitutional scrutiny in light of its severity and finality 
as a punishment.59
In later cases, however, this principle served to diminish the scrutiny
of non-capital punishments under the Eighth Amendment, rather than to 
increase the constitutional scrutiny of capital cases.60 This principle has 
essentially meant that the uniqueness of the death penalty limits 
consideration of other punishments because they are not as “unusual.”61
                                                                                                                     
59. Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman v. Georgia is apparently the origin of the 
Court’s “death is different” capital jurisprudence. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober 
Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital 
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 370 (1995) (crediting Justice Brennan as the originator of 
this line of argument); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“Death is a unique punishment in the United States.”); Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-
Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 118 (2004) 
(discussing the Court’s death-is-different jurisprudence). 
60. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009); William W. 
Berry III, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1064 (2013); Berry, Eighth 
Amendment Presumptions, supra note 4, at 77.
61. Barkow, supra note 60; see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991).
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Indeed, the Court has elected not to apply the evolving standards of 
decency in non-capital cases.62
Because death is different, the Court provides almost complete 
deference to states in punishing non-capital offenses, with the Eighth 
Amendment barring only punishments that are grossly 
disproportionate.63 There has only been one case that has ever met this 
standard, and even then, the Court subsequently narrowed that decision.64
In recent years, the Court has discovered another kind of differentness 
under the Eighth Amendment—juveniles.65 As a result, the Court has 
applied the Eighth Amendment to restrict the imposition of juvenile life-
without-parole (JLWOP) sentences for non-homicide crimes and the 
imposition of mandatory LWOP sentences.66 Again, the instinct of the 
Court tracks majoritarian tendencies. The United States is the only 
country in the world that allows JLWOP sentences.67
The Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has used the concept 
of unusualness as a basis for hiding from its traditional role of interpreting 
the Constitution. Instead, the Court has demonstrated a preference for
allowing the counter-majoritarian constitutional provision to track the 
                                                                                                                     
62. The recent exception to this is juvenile LWOP cases. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 
489 (2012) (banning mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 
(2010) (banning LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders in non-homicide crimes); William W. 
Berry III, The Mandate of Miller, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327, 340 (2014).
63. The Court has historically refused to extend the doctrine to non-capital cases, even 
where the sentence seems particularly excessive. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66, 
77 (2003) (affirming on habeas review two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life for 
stealing approximately $150 of videotapes, where defendant had three prior felony convictions); 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003) (affirming sentence of twenty-five years to life 
for stealing approximately $1,200 of golf clubs, where defendant had four prior felony 
convictions); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961, 996 (affirming sentence of LWOP for first offense of 
possessing 672 grams of cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370–72 (1982) (per curiam) 
(affirming two consecutive sentences of twenty years for possession with intent to distribute and 
distribution of nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265–66 (1980) 
(affirming a LWOP sentence for felony theft of $120.75 by false pretenses where defendant had
three prior convictions). But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279–84 (1983) (reversing sentence 
of LWOP for presenting a no account check for $100, where defendant had six prior felony 
convictions).
64. Compare Solem, 463 U.S. at 284, with Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996.
65. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74; see also Berry, supra note 62, at 
339, 345 (discussing the application of LWOP to juveniles).
66. See, e.g., Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (banning mandatory JLWOP sentences); Graham, 560 
U.S. at 74 (banning LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders in non-homicide crimes); see also
Berry, supra note 62, at 328 (discussing the series of Supreme Court cases that have affected 
LWOP sentences); Berry, supra note 60, at 1068–69 (2013) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
decision banning mandatory LWOP in juvenile sentences).
67. See Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison: 
Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 990 (2008); see also DE LA VEGA ET AL., supra
note 3, at 9.
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majoritarian trends in state legislatures. This unusual deference has not 
been without consequences. Three cases in particular demonstrate how 
the Court’s abdication of its role in protecting individual rights under the 
Eighth Amendment has resulted in widespread abuse and over-
punishment by state legislatures and criminal justice systems. 
C. The Problem of Disproportionate Sentences (Harmelin)
The first of these cases, Harmelin v. Michigan, imposed a cruel and 
unusual punishment on a first-time drug offender. Even worse, it closed 
the door on the examination of many similar cases under the Eighth 
Amendment.
1. Harmelin v. Michigan
In Harmelin, the Supreme Court considered whether the mandatory 
LWOP sentence imposed on Ronald Allen Harmelin, for possessing more 
than 650 grams of cocaine, violated the Eighth Amendment.68 As this 
conviction was his first criminal offense, Harmelin argued on appeal that 
the sentence was disproportionate to the offense, rendering it a cruel and 
unusual punishment.69
The Court rejected Harmelin’s argument based on two broad 
principles: (1) death is different70 and (2) deference to state legislatures.71
The majority split between the opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, and the plurality opinion of Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, joined by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Justice David 
Souter.72 In his opinion, Justice Scalia applied an originalist analysis and 
found that the Eighth Amendment did not include a proportionality 
guarantee.73 The plurality (and the dissenters) found otherwise, 
concluding that the Eighth Amendment did include a proportionality 
guarantee.74
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, in comparison, emphasized the 
narrowness of this principle.75 Specifically, the opinion cited to the need 
to defer to state penological judgment, granting substantial deference to 
                                                                                                                     
68. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961.
69. Id. at 994. 
70. Id. at 995.
71. Id. at 998–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 960 (Scalia, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 965–85. 
74. Id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting). The Court had reached this conclusion on multiple 
prior occasions. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 
n.3 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271–74, 274 n.11 (1980); Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910).
75. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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legislative determinations.76 The opinion referenced the wide variety of 
state punishment practices, both in terms of purposes of punishment and 
sentencing practices, as a basis for the Court not intervening.77 The 
opinion also discussed the absence of objective factors by which to assess 
proportionality as a basis for deferring to states.78 The opinion ultimately 
settled on an approach of limiting the application of the Eighth 
Amendment to situations where the punishment is grossly 
disproportionate to the crime.79
All five Justices then held that the mandatory nature of the sentence
in this case did not violate Harmelin’s rights.80 Despite the Court’s 
adoption of individualized sentencing principles in Woodson v. North 
Carolina81 and Lockett v. Ohio,82 the Court limited these principles to 
capital cases, relying on its “death is different” concept.83
The Court’s errors here lie in according too much deference to state 
legislatures and courts. Indeed, the incorporation of the Eighth 
Amendment into the Fourteenth exists for the purpose of defending 
criminal defendants against legislative overreach. Here, the Court seems 
inclined to defer to the states because there are many ways of 
administering criminal justice. That may be true, but the Court’s role is 
to distinguish the constitutional from the unconstitutional based on the 
concept of cruel and unusual punishments, which, at the very least,
encompasses some notion of disproportionality.84
An additional basis for the Court’s deference was its view that there 
is no objective standard for determining proportionality.85 Ironically, the 
Court has used the purposes of punishment in exactly this way in a series
of cases that assess whether certain kinds of capital sentences are 
disproportionate.86
                                                                                                                     
76. Id. at 998–99.
77. Id. at 999–1000.
78. Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth 
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 582 (2005).
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 581. 
81. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
82. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
83. Frase, supra note 78, at 582.
84. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377–79 (1910); see also discussion supra
Part I.
85. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000–01 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (discussing the existence of 
objective indicia of societal standards contributed to disproportionality analysis); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564, 568 (2005) (discussing how objective indicia of national consensus 
guided the conclusion that sentences of death for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (using state legislation as evidence of objective 
standards for proportionality review); see also Berry, supra note 35, at 19–20.
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The Court likewise misreads the “death is different” concept as a basis 
for lowering scrutiny for non-capital sentences, a far cry from the purpose
indicated at the genesis of the concept. By limiting Eighth Amendment 
claims in effect to capital cases, the Court has abdicated its role as
preventer of excessive punishment at a state level and instead opened the 
door to mass incarceration.87 This decision has essentially led to two 
tracks of criminal justice—capital and non-capital.88 This arbitrary 
approach allows the court to further defer to states in non-capital cases 
by allowing mandatory sentences and denying offenders the ability to 
offer mitigating evidence at sentencing. Given the stakes of the Harmelin 
case itself, it seems particularly cruel to deny Harmelin the ability to 
plead for his life, as the state is effectively imposing a death sentence.89
2.  The Consequences of Harmelin
At the heart of America’s mass incarceration problem remains the 
imposition of excessive punishments.90 The length of prison sentence 
awarded for many crimes in American jurisdictions, in many cases, far 
exceeds the sentence imposed in other Western countries for committing 
a similar crime.91 Furthermore, most American jurisdictions, particularly 
the federal government, impose a severe sentence increase for second and 
third time offenders.92 This recidivist premium often has an exponential 
dimension, drastically increasing the sentence, and becoming 
significantly larger with each increase in criminal history category.93
Similarly, mandatory minimum sentences often result in a higher 
sentence than a court might otherwise impose.94 The volume of 
mandatory sentences, and the amount of incarceration mandated by each 
sentence, has contributed significantly to the growth of the carceral state 
in America over the past three decades.95
                                                                                                                     
87. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001) (discussing mass 
incarceration and reasons for its rise); MARC MAUER, THE RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999) 
(discussing the rise in incarceration rates starting in the 1970s).
88. See generally Barkow, supra note 60 (discussing the Court’s two approaches to 
substantive sentencing law involving capital and non-capital cases).
89. See William W. Berry III, Life-With-Hope Sentencing: The Argument for Replacing 
Life-Without-Parole Sentences with Presumptive Life Sentences, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1065
(2015); Berry, supra note 62, at 338–40.
90. See DE LA VEGA ET AL., supra note 3, at 15.
91. See id. at 25–26.
92. Alexis M. Durham III, Justice in Sentencing: The Role of Prior Record of Criminal 
Involvement, 78 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 614, 620 (1987).
93. Id.; see also Berry, Eighth Amendment Presumptions, supra note 4, at 78 (discussing 
various sources that contribute to the rise in incarceration).
94. See DE LA VEGA ET AL., supra note 3, at 8.
95. MAUER, supra note 87, at 32.
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss2/3
2018] UNUSUAL DEFERENCE 331
One clear problem with mandatory sentences is that they shift 
sentencing discretion from the Court to the prosecutor. If the Court lacks 
the discretion to determine the sentence, the prosecutor effectively 
chooses the sentence by deciding what level of crime to charge in a given 
case. And research has demonstrated that the increasingly punitive 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the local and state level has been 
one of the major drivers of the mass incarceration epidemic.96
In the capital context, the Court has placed restrictions on mandatory 
death sentences.97 Specifically, the Court has emphasized the importance 
of considering mitigating evidence and making individualized sentencing 
determinations.98 In addition, the Court has extended this right to juvenile 
offenders facing LWOP sentences.99
As I have argued elsewhere, the Court ought to extend the right to 
mitigation and individualized sentencing determinations to LWOP
sentences, at a minimum, as well as to other lengthy sentences.100 The 
Court’s decision in Harmelin, however, currently forecloses such an 
application of the Eighth Amendment.101 The consequences of Harmelin
are severe for criminal defendants, and ultimately free states to punish 
non-capital offenders without oversight or limit. Such an application of 
this decision serves to block constitutional review of disproportionate 
punishments in non-capital cases, rendering the Eighth Amendment a 
dead letter in these non-capital contexts. 
This decision also allows for the imposition of mandatory sentences 
without restriction, reallocating sentencing discretion from judges to 
prosecutors. In doing so, Harmelin has denied many offenders the right 
to plead for mercy, and in many cases, for their life, at sentencing.102
Harmelin has removed the most obvious potential impediment to mass 
incarceration. It also facilitated the proliferation of LWOP sentences in 
the United States (41,000 and counting), unforeseen in the history of the 
world.103
                                                                                                                     
96. See John Pfaff, Federal Sentencing in the States: Some Thoughts on Federal Grants 
and State Imprisonment, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1567, 1567 (2015); Donald A. Dripps, Guilt, 
Innocence, and Due Process of Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV 1343, 1357–58 (2016).
97. E.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 
U.S. 325, 335–36 (1976).
98. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114–15 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 
605–06 (1978).
99. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).
100. Berry, supra note 62, at 345–46; Berry, supra note 60, at 1085.
101. Although, as Miller demonstrates, the strength of stare decisis on this point is dubious 
at best as a barrier to remedying this doctrinal error. See generally Berry, supra note 62 (discussing 
the effects of Miller on LWOP jurisprudence).
102. Id. at 335.
103. See John Tierney, Life Without Parole: Four Inmates’ Stories, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 
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A final corollary consequence of Harmelin has been with respect to 
the potential application of the Eighth Amendment to federal drug 
sentences. In establishing that the Eighth Amendment does not place any 
real restriction on non-capital sentences, excessive federal drug sentences
(many of which were mandatory) continued to persist after Harmelin.104
3.  Considerations of Stare Decisis
The Court’s approach in Harmelin itself lowered the bar for stare 
decisis in Eighth Amendment cases by reversing the Court’s prior 
approach from eight years before in Solem v. Helm.105 The Court
explained, “[w]e have long recognized, of course, that the doctrine 
of stare decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional precedents, 
and we think that to be especially true of a constitutional precedent that 
is both recent and in apparent tension with other decisions.”106
Recent history suggests that Harmelin ought to be hoisted on its own 
petard and overruled by the Court. Recent development of the principles 
of (1) proportionality, (2) differentness, and (3) individualized sentencing 
suggest that this decision is “in apparent tension with other decisions.”107
Beginning in 2002, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Eighth 
Amendment contains a proportionality guarantee that prohibits the 
imposition of certain death and JLWOP sentences.108 These cases apply 
the principle of the purposes of punishment to help determine 
excessiveness.
With respect to differentness, the Court has recognized a second kind 
of differentness—juvenile offenders. The Court has thus started to chip 
away at the differentness bright-line by applying the Eighth Amendment 
to restrict state punishment practices in non-capital cases.109
Finally, in one of the JLWOP cases, Miller v. Alabama,110 the Court 
reinvigorated its principle from Woodson and Lockett that offenders 
deserve individualized sentencing consideration.111 This decision casts 
some doubt on the efficacy of the mandatory sentencing part of Harmelin.
                                                                                                                     
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/science/life-without-parole-four-inmates-stories.html.
104. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 89 (2010).
105. 463 U.S. 277, 279–84 (1983) (reversing sentence of LWOP for presenting a no account 
check for $100, where defendant had six prior felony convictions).
106. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (citations omitted).
107. Id.; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469–70, 475 (2012).
108. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 
(2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
109. See Berry, supra note 62, at 347.
110. 567 U.S. 460.
111. Id. at 475 (banning mandatory JLWOP sentences).
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss2/3
2018] UNUSUAL DEFERENCE 333
D. The Problem of Arbitrary Death Sentences (Pulley)
While the problem of Harmelin is the absence of review of non-
capital sentences, the problem of Pulley v. Harris is the absence of review 
of jury imposition of death sentences. As explained below, the failure to 
examine such decisions results in a series of arbitrary capital sentencing 
outcomes.
1. Pulley v. Harris
In Pulley, the petitioner appealed his death sentence on the ground that 
the California Supreme Court did not engage in comparative 
proportionality review of his sentence.112 The California scheme at the 
time required appellate review of death sentences but did not compare 
those sentences to other cases.113 The Court held that California’s system 
did not violate the Eighth Amendment, highlighting its prior decision in 
Jurek v. Texas,114 where it had affirmed Texas’s capital sentencing 
scheme that, likewise, did not mandate comparative proportionality 
review.115 The Court explained that the Constitution did not require 
comparative proportionality review.116 Rather, the Constitution merely 
demands meaningful appellate review such that the sentencing outcome 
is not arbitrary.117
2.  The Consequences of Pulley
In addition to preventing the regulation of disproportionate and 
mandatory punishments, the Court’s unusual deference approach also 
enables states to impose arbitrary punishments, particularly in capital 
cases. The Court’s holding in Furman struck down the death penalty in 
large part because of the randomness of the outcomes in jury sentencing. 
Justice Potter Stewart famously likened the imposition of the death 
penalty at that time to being “struck by lightning.”118
                                                                                                                     
112. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 39–40 (1984).
113. Id. at 53 (recognizing that “[t]he [California] statute does not require comparative 
proportionality review”).
114. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
115. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 50–51. Part of the Court’s reaction to the Furman backlash described 
above, Jurek also is of questionable merit, particularly because it allows for death sentences based 
upon future dangerousness. See William W. Berry III, Ending Death by Dangerousness: A Path 
to the De Facto Abolition of the Death Penalty, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889, 915–16 (2010). I do not
discuss it separately here because its shortcomings are cabined to Texas.
116. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 53.
117. Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that 
“meaningful appellate review is an indispensable component of the Court's determination that the 
State’s capital sentencing procedure is valid”).
118. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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A quick look at the modern death penalty suggests little has changed. 
Annually, there are over 15,000 murders in the United States,119 and the 
number of executions has been fewer than fifty-five per year for the last 
decade.120 The individuals executed are often not the worst offenders.121
Rather, a number of inappropriate variables—geography,122
prosecutors,123 lawyering,124 and race125—seem to have a determinative 
effect on who receives the death penalty.
Jury sentencing remains one source of the wide disparity in capital 
sentencing outcomes.126 Jurors historically lacked any guidance in 
sentencing capital cases, making for wide variations in sentencing 
results.127 After Furman, states adopted aggravating and mitigating 
                                                                                                                     
119. KENNETH D. KOCHANEK, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEATHS: FINAL 
DATA FOR 2014, at 44 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr65/nvsr65_04.pdf 
(detailing 15,872 total deaths in 2014 by homicide).
120. Executions by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions-year (last updated Sept. 13, 2017).
121. See William W. Berry III, Ending the Death Lottery: A Case Study of Ohio’s Broken 
Proportionality Review, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 67, 92 (2015) (commenting that a large percentage of 
Ohio capital cases since 1996 did not warrant the death penalty).
122. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating 
Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 308–09 (2010) (commenting that 
capital punishment is often sought only by a handful of counties).
123. See FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT, AMERICA’S TOP FIVE DEADLIEST PROSECUTORS: HOW 
OVERZEALOUS PERSONALITIES DRIVE THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (2016), http://www.fairpunishment.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/FPP-Top5Report_FINAL.pdf.
124. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit of the Public Good: Lawyers Who Care, Joseph L. 
Rauh Lecture (Apr. 9, 2001), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/
sp_04-09-01a (“I have yet to see a death case, among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on 
eve of execution petitions, in which the defendant was well represented at trial.”); Charles 
Lane, O’Connor Expresses Death Penalty Doubt, WASH. POST (July 4, 2001),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/07/04/oconnor-expresses-death-penalty-
doubt/bcafbc53-43d0-4af5-9f5f-b124c6c66cd5/?utm_term=.c592da5d8246 (“‘Perhaps it’s time 
to look at minimum standards for appointed counsel in death cases and adequate compensation 
for appointed counsel when they are used,’ O’Connor said.”).
125. See generally David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the 
Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special 
Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194 (2003) (commenting that African-
American defendants are sentenced to death more often when the victim is Caucasian, as opposed 
to any other defendant/victim combination).
126. Prosecutorial discretion also plays a major role here, but to date the Court has not 
applied the Constitution to restrict such discretion.
127. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971) (holding that the broad discretion 
afforded to juries did not violate the petitioners’ due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment), reh’g granted and vacated on other grounds by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 
(1972).
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circumstances or similar guideposts to guide juries.128 Even so, studies 
since Furman demonstrate wide variances in sentencing outcomes.129
The Supreme Court in Gregg, which reinstated the death penalty after 
Furman,130 allowed its reintroduction based not only upon the adoption 
of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to frame jury discretion,
but also appellate review by the state supreme court with respect to the 
proportionality of the sentence imposed.131 Specifically, this comparative 
proportionality review sought to identify outliers in outcomes to mandate 
some level of consistency in outcomes.132
The tension between individualized sentencing determinations in 
capital cases and consistency in results remains.133 While the outcomes 
do not have to be identical, they certainly cannot be random or arbitrary
given the consequences of the sentence (death).134 Comparative 
proportionality review by a state supreme court can reduce and even 
                                                                                                                     
128. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 58 (2007) 
(noting that, after Furman, Georgia amended its death penalty statute to include aggravating 
circumstances).
129. For more on the general regression toward a pre-Furman era death penalty 
jurisprudence, see John H. Blume et al., When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina’s Return 
to the Unconstitutional, Standardless Capital Sentencing Regime of the Pre-Furman Era, 4 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 479, 483 (2010) (arguing that South Carolina’s system has returned to its 
pre-Furman status); Bill Rankin et al., From 2007: A Matter of Life and Death: Death Still 
Arbitrary, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Sept. 23, 2007), http://www.myajc.com/news/state--regional/
from-2007-matter-life-and-death-death-still-arbitrary/uQMik03eSLJ7VlI4wvUZnN/ (reporting 
that “56 percent of all murders in the decade studied [in Georgia] were . . . eligible for death, 
including hundreds of moderately aggravated cases”); John Seigenthaler, Deeper Look Shows 
Even More Cases of Unequal Justice, TENNESSEAN (Jan. 10, 2010), http://gaile-
owens.blogspot.com/2010/01/deeper-look-shows-even-more-cases-of.html (reporting on the 
striking differences in sentences that state judges and juries gave women convicted of killing their 
abusive husbands in Tennessee).
130. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (plurality opinion).
131. Id. at 196–98.
132. See William W. Berry III, Promulgating Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69, 96–97 
(2011) (describing the proportionality analysis model as a question of absolute and relative 
proportionality followed by appellate review).
133. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656, 664–65 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment) (noting that “our jurisprudence and logic have long since parted 
ways” because “[t]he latter requirement [(individualized factual determinations)] quite obviously 
destroys whatever rationality and predictability the former requirement [(limitations on jury 
discretion)] was designed to achieve”), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002); 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976); 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206; see also William W. Berry III, Practicing Proportionality, 64 FLA. L.
REV. 687, 690 (2012) (explaining that “the consideration of individualized, mitigating facts 
necessary for absolute proportionality review eviscerates the consistency achieved by relative 
proportionality parameters”); Berry, supra note 132, at 71 (noting the balance courts must strike 
between case-by-case analysis and consistent results).
134. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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eliminate randomness in cases by comparing the case on appeal to similar 
cases and assessing the outcome in such cases.135
Nonetheless, this safeguard constituted a central reason why the 
Supreme Court in Gregg upheld Georgia’s revised capital scheme, as it 
provided protection against the random and arbitrary outcomes 
condemned in the opinions in Furman.136 To be clear, the central concern 
in Furman was the random and arbitrary administration of the death 
penalty, of which juries were a primary cause.137 As explained below, 
Pulley undermined this safeguard by removing it from the purview of the 
Eighth Amendment.138
Pulley’s consequences are twofold. First, petitioners cannot raise a 
constitutional challenge based on the lack of comparative proportionality 
imposed by states at sentencing.139 With this no longer being part of the 
Eighth Amendment, the Court has undermined a significant part of the 
safeguards it upheld in Gregg as the basis for satisfying the concerns 
identified in Furman.140 The appellate court merely has to pay lip service 
to the sentence by saying it was not arbitrary, as there is no required point 
of comparison to address the wild variances that arise from jury 
sentencing.141 Second, states that still utilize proportionality review 
merely violate state statutes by failing to apply it rigorously, leaving them 
free to administer it in a cavalier manner.142 Furthermore, there is a strong 
likelihood that pro-death penalty legislatures will eliminate comparative 
proportionality review if the courts use it to reverse death sentences.143
Indeed, the manner in which states apply proportionality review, for 
the most part, guarantees that no case will ever be disproportionate.144
Most state supreme courts that use this method compare the case on 
                                                                                                                     
135. See Berry, supra note 121, at 96–97.
136. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206 (“The provision for appellate review . . . serves as a check 
against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. In particular, the proportionality 
review substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action 
of an aberrant jury.”).
137. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 140–49.
139. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1984).
140. See Berry, supra note 121, at 74–75; Berry, supra note 133, at 697.
141. See Berry, supra note 121, at 75; Berry, supra note 133, at 707.
142. See Berry, supra note 133, at 697.
143. See id. at 696; Berry, supra note 121, at 74–75.
144. See David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical 
Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 668–69 (1983) [hereinafter 
Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences]. See generally DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990) (describing 
proportionality review in different state courts); RAYMOND PATERNOSTER ET AL., THE DEATH 
PENALTY: AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2008) (explaining the appellate 
review process undertaken by state supreme courts).
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appeal to one or more similar death cases that involved the same statutory 
aggravating circumstance.145 Not only do the courts refuse to examine 
cases with similar fact patterns where the defendant received a life 
sentence, but they also use aggravating factors—concepts that can 
encompass a wide range of dissimilar factual situations—as the basis for 
identifying similar cases.146 In Walker v. Georgia,147 Justice John Paul 
Stevens’s dissent to the denial of certiorari made this point.148 Serving as 
one member who wrote the plurality opinion in Gregg, he chastised the 
Georgia Supreme Court for the cursory manner in which it conducted 
comparative proportionality review in capital cases. Justice Stevens 
explained:
Rather than perform a thorough proportionality review to 
mitigate the heightened risks of arbitrariness and 
discrimination in this case, the Georgia Supreme Court 
carried out an utterly perfunctory review. . . .
. . . . 
Particularly troubling is that the shortcomings of the 
Georgia Supreme Court’s review are not unique to this case.
. . . 
. . . And the likely result . . . is the arbitrary or 
discriminatory imposition of death sentences in 
contravention of the Eighth Amendment.149
The reality, then, is that state supreme courts provide no check against 
disparities in jury sentencing—the problem identified in Furman—thus 
allowing arbitrariness to persist.
3.  Considerations of Stare Decisis
Without comparative proportionality review, the Furman problem of 
arbitrary and random capital sentencing outcomes persist. Pulley is
perhaps the most significant in a line of cases that largely undermines the 
protections affirmed in Gregg. As such, the Court could easily reverse 
Pulley on the grounds that it is inconsistent with Furman and allows the 
persistence of arbitrary death sentences.
                                                                                                                     
145. See Berry, supra note 121, at 77; Berry, supra note 133, at 708.
146. See Berry, supra note 133, at 708.
147. 555 U.S. 979 (2008).
148. Id. at 982–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 982–84.
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In addition, the Court has a long history of reversing its Eighth 
Amendment cases.150 For instance, it reversed Penry v. Lynaugh151 and 
Stanford v. Kentucky152 in its decisions in Atkins v. Virginia153 and Roper
v. Simmons.154 Certainly, stare decisis should not preclude a careful re-
examination of Pulley and arbitrariness in jury sentencing outcomes.
E. The Problem of Discriminatory Death Sentences (McCleskey)
In addition to deferring to the states on the question of mandatory 
sentences, absolute proportionality, and comparative proportionality, the 
Supreme Court has ultimately deferred to states on the most fundamental 
question of fairness—racial discrimination. 
1. McCleskey v. Kemp
In McCleskey v. Kemp, Warren McCleskey challenged Georgia’s 
capital punishment system on the grounds that systemic race 
discrimination resulted in an arbitrary death penalty in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.155 To support his claim, McCleskey 
introduced two studies performed by David Baldus and his colleagues.156
These studies demonstrated clear evidence of racial discrimination in
Georgia’s death penalty system.157
Specifically, the Baldus studies showed that offenders who killed 
white victims were four times more likely to receive the death penalty 
than those who killed African-American victims.158 In addition to 
demonstrating the significant role race played in jury outcomes, the 
studies also showed how race influenced the decisions of prosecutors.159
Illustratively, cases in which an African-American killer murdered a 
                                                                                                                     
150. See generally Meghan J. Ryan, Does Stare Decisis Apply in the Eighth Amendment 
Death Penalty Context?, 85 N.C. L. REV. 847 (2007) (explaining that Eighth Amendment law is 
constantly changing).
151. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
152. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
153. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
154. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
155. 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987). For more on the story behind the case, see JEFFREY L.
KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE AMERICAN DEATH 
PENALTY (2015).
156. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286–87; see Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death 
Sentences, supra note 144, at 731.
157. See Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences, supra note 144, at 731 
(“Finally, our analyses suggest that Georgia’s death-sentencing system is tainted by the influence 
of arbitrary and capricious factors, notably the victim’s race . . . .”); see also William W. Berry 
III, Repudiating Death, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 441, 459 n.91 (2011).
158. See Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences, supra note 144, at 709.
159. Id.
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white victim were substantially more likely to garner capital prosecutions 
than cases where a white killer murdered an African-American victim.160
The Supreme Court did not challenge the results of Baldus’s studies
and assumed, for purposes of the case, that the results were accurate.161
Nonetheless, the Court denied McCleskey’s claims in a narrow 5–4
decision.162 At the heart of the Court’s reasoning rested two central 
conclusions. First, in order to demonstrate prejudice warranting relief
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court held that 
McCleskey must have shown more than just systemic racial 
discrimination.163 The Court concluded that to prevail, he must have 
shown that racial discrimination affected the outcome of his particular 
case.164 The Court majority thus ignored the systemic discrimination 
because McCleskey lacked proof of individualized discrimination, 
despite both (1) the difficulty in proving such discrimination and (2) that 
his conviction and sentence occurred within a discriminatory system.165
Second, the Court opined that ruling in McCleskey’s favor would 
open Pandora’s box to claims it did not want to pursue. For example, if 
the Court found that Baldus’s evidence regarding Georgia’s systematic 
racial discrimination in capital cases warranted relief for McCleskey, 
then, in theory, it would open the door for habeas corpus claims from all 
of Georgia’s death row.166 Further, if similar evidence indicated that the 
systemic racial discrimination went beyond just capital sentencing, 
petitioners could challenge the entire criminal justice system in Georgia
and have grounds for relitigating their convictions.167 This slippery slope 
articulated by the Court served in part to justify its decision to ignore the 
Baldus evidence’s possible application to McCleskey and instead require 
proof of such discrimination on an individual level.168
Again, deference to the states echoes through this decision. By 
deferring to states, even when states act maliciously, the Court prefers the 
majority practice to constitutional restriction.
                                                                                                                     
160. Id. at 709 n.131.
161. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7.
162. Id. at 319.
163. Id. at 292.
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 292–93.
166. Id. at 315.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 314. 
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2.  The Consequences of McCleskey
From the time of Furman, the Court has been aware of the influence 
of race in capital cases.169 For example, several of the concurring 
opinions in Furman highlighted the racial disparity in the administration 
of the death penalty.170 Over time, a number of studies have explored this 
issue. As explained below, such studies have consistently demonstrated 
that the race of the victim is predictive of death sentences, with homicides 
of white victims being more likely to result in death sentences than 
homicides of African-American victims.
There remains significant evidence that racial discrimination persists 
in the criminal justice system.171 This persistence becomes particularly 
troubling in capital cases, when the stakes are so high. The idea that race 
plays a significant role in determining which offenders receive the death 
penalty undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system as a 
whole.
The most obvious consequence of McCleskey rests in the persistence 
of race discrimination in capital cases, not only in Georgia, but also 
throughout the United States.172 Indeed, evidence continues to show that 
race plays a significant role in the administration of the death penalty in 
the United States, usually arising out of prosecutorial discretion and 
sentencing determinations.173
This decision also discourages broader challenges to discrimination in 
state and federal sentencing practices. With the Court requiring proof of 
discrimination on an individualized level, it made attacks on 
discrimination in capital cases substantially more difficult.174 Perhaps 
more importantly, the McCleskey decision closed the door to systemic 
challenges to race discrimination.175 As a result, states lack any incentive,
at least constitutionally driven ones, to engage in reform to cure race-
based capital sentencing. Finally, the McCleskey decision invited the 
Court in later opinions to mandate that individual proof, and not systemic 
                                                                                                                     
169. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 250 n.15 (1972).
170. Id. at 249–51 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 364 
(Marshall, J., concurring). 
171. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 104 (highlighting racial disparity in the justice 
system); BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2014) (further 
highlighting racial inequality in sentencing); 13TH (Netflix 2016) (documentary examining the 
history of racial inequality in the prison system).
172. See Race and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-and-death-penalty (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
173. See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 125, at 214–15 (2003).
174. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 311 (1987).
175. See id. at 292–97.
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error, had to serve as a basis for relief for potentially afflicted 
offenders.176
The best example of this arises in execution cases when the Court 
requires that an offender demonstrate that a particular execution 
procedure creates a substantial risk of severe pain for him, and not 
generally.177 With a procedure like lethal injection that hides the effects 
of its drugs by using a paralytic, the petitioner cannot know what will 
happen to him with respect to pain.178 The design of the procedure is such 
that no one watching can know whether the potassium chloride caused 
pain, because the paralytic makes it impossible for the petitioner to have 
any visible reaction.179 And yet, the Court relied on the same reasoning 
as McCleskey in affirming two different versions of the lethal injection 
procedures. By requiring proof of individualized prejudice where such 
prejudice remains hidden, the Court essentially foreclosed legitimate 
challenges to systemic risks of constitutional violations, whether based 
on race discrimination or cruel and unusual infliction of torturous pain.
3.  Considerations of Stare Decisis
The author of the majority opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, had 
second thoughts concerning the McCleskey decision.180 When asked by 
his former law clerk whether he would change his vote in a prior case, 
Justice Powell responded, “Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp.”181
With one member of its 5–4 majority later recanting his opinion, 
McCleskey is ripe for re-examination. This is particularly true because of 
the volume of additional social science evidence that supports Baldus’s 
Georgia studies. The overwhelming evidence demonstrates that race 
unfairly influences the imposition of the death penalty. Such a reality 
remains intolerable in a criminal justice system that purports to be just 
and fair.
In addition, the Pandora’s box argument from the Court remains 
overstated. Where there is compelling evidence of systemic 
discrimination in a state over a period of time, one easy solution would 
be to commute the death sentences during that time to LWOP. The 
practical difference might be insignificant, as states are slow to execute 
                                                                                                                     
176. See id. at 292.
177. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2737 (2015); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51–52
(2008).
178. See Berry & Ryan, supra note 45, at 425.
179. Id. at 406.
180. See Berry, supra note 157, at 442–43. 
181. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451 (1994) (quoting a conversation 
between Justice Powell and his former law clerk, John Jeffries, which was recorded for a 
biography of Justice Powell that Jeffries wrote).
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their offenders anyway, often taking over a decade to impose the 
sentence.182 Likewise, almost two-thirds of capital cases contain error 
that causes appellate courts to reverse them.183 Reversing a few more to 
remedy race discrimination does not seem so far-fetched. 
Finally, the Court could use its death-is-different principle as a basis 
for only re-examining capital cases, rather than other examples of 
discrimination in criminal justice. To be sure, states should really make 
every effort to eliminate race discrimination in the present and future, as 
well as remedy instances of such injustice occurring in the past. The 
overwhelming nature of that project should not chill the Court from 
starting with capital cases to remedy the most serious of injustices.
III. REMEDYING UNUSUAL DEFERENCE
Part I of this Article demonstrated the genesis of the Court’s unusual 
deference to states in sentencing criminal offenders. In Part II, it 
demonstrated how the core absolute proportionality doctrine remains 
limited in its application because it relies on majoritarian concepts as the 
normative foundation for the counter-majoritarian constitutional 
proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.
Part II then examined three of the most egregious examples of how 
this cancer spread to accord states deference with respect to absolute 
proportionality, mandatory sentences, comparative proportionality, and 
discrimination. This Part concludes this Article by articulating a first 
principles approach to the Eighth Amendment that robustly defends 
individual rights and does not blindly defer to states.
A. The Basic Framework
Contrary to the Court’s decisions, it is possible to create a framework 
to apply the Eighth Amendment more broadly to undercut mass 
incarceration. At the very least, the individual rights of criminal offenders 
warrant doctrinal reconsideration.
1.  Three Aspects: Type, Method, and Technique
The Eighth Amendment applies to three separate aspects of punishing 
criminal offenders: the type of punishment, the method of punishment, 
and the technique of punishment.184 In a lethal injection, for instance, the 
type of punishment is death, the method is lethal injection, and the 
                                                                                                                     
182. See Krista MacKay, Note, The Rise of Systematic Pre-Execution?Delay: Proposing a 
Solution to Decades on Death Row, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1163, 1181 (2016).
183. See Howard Mintz, Death Sentence Reversals Cast Doubt on System, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR. (Apr. 13, 2002), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/534.
184. Berry & Ryan, supra note 45, at 409.
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technique is the three-drug protocol. All three should be subject to the 
same inquiry under the Eighth Amendment.
Before exploring each, it is worth recalling that the Court’s cases and 
the originalist interpretations of the Eighth Amendment both envision a 
constitutional provision that evolves over time. Also, for purposes of this 
analysis, the concepts of “cruel and unusual” are applied as a unitary 
concept.185 In addition, each of these three aspects of punishment—the 
type, the method, and the technique—cannot be cruel and unusual in an 
individual sense or a systemic sense.186 The individual inquiry into 
whether the Constitution proscribes an aspect of punishment has two 
components: (1) core normative values and (2) absolute proportionality. 
The systemic inquiry likewise has two parts: (1) comparative 
proportionality and (2) systemic fairness.
2.  Individual Inquiry (Core Values and Absolute Proportionality)
The first individual inquiry applies the core normative values of the 
Eighth Amendment—the dignity of man and the right to be free from 
torture. This concept, which needs further development by the Court, 
mirrors the Court’s decision in Trop v. Dulles, where it held that 
denationalization was an unconstitutional type of punishment.187 Other 
punishment types, methods, or techniques that compromise the dignity of 
an offender or are otherwise particularly brutal might fall under this 
proscription as well.
Further, the Court should require individualized sentencing 
determinations in all cases with serious punishments. At the very least, 
the Court should eliminate mandatory LWOP sentences in the same way 
it has eliminated mandatory JLWOP sentences and mandatory death 
sentences. As the Court’s capital cases show, the dignity of the offender 
requires individualized sentencing consideration in cases involving the 
punishment of death.188 This principle should apply irrespective of 
whether the death is in a prison cell or in an execution chamber.
The second individual inquiry, absolute proportionality, explores 
whether the punishment type, method, or technique is excessive in light 
of the crime committed.189 This assessment requires application of the 
purposes of punishment190 to make such a determination, as the Court has 
done in the application of its subjective view under the evolving-
standards-of-decency doctrine. As in Weems, the Court should proscribe 
excessive punishments that are disproportionate. Unlike its current 
                                                                                                                     
185. See Bray, supra note 56.
186. Berry & Ryan, supra note 45, at 409–10.
187. See 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958).
188. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987).
189. See Berry, supra note 132, at 96.
190. See Berry, supra note 43. But see Stinneford, supra note 43, at 962.
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practice, the Court should apply this absolute proportionality inquiry to 
all cases, not just capital and JLWOP ones, as punishments not 
approaching death can still be both wildly disproportionate and constitute 
cruel and unusual punishments.
3.  Systemic Inquiry (Comparative Proportionality and Fairness)
The Eighth Amendment’s systemic inquiry exists to make sure that 
arbitrariness does not persist in the administration of punishment types, 
methods, or techniques.191 Comparative proportionality review in capital 
cases exists to remedy inconsistencies in jury verdicts.192 While this is 
less of a concern with lower level punishments, death sentences require 
some modicum of consistency or, at the very least, something more than
complete arbitrariness. The Eighth Amendment should thus require 
appellate review of jury sentencing outcomes in capital cases by state 
supreme courts. Otherwise, the Court’s decision in Furman has no 
meaning.
The second systemic inquiry should read the Eighth Amendment to 
prohibit any pervasive influence of non-acceptable indicia, particularly 
race. Where the Court finds race discrimination or other systemic error, 
the Court cannot simply pretend as if it does not exist or otherwise wish 
it away as it did in McCleskey.
The Court can order remedies to address these problems, much like it 
has done in other contexts like affirmative action.193 While the cost of re-
litigating cases is expensive, the cost of injustice is much higher, 
particularly in the context of the death penalty. While finality perhaps can 
trump justice in some contexts, the death penalty should not be one of 
them.194
B. Some Applications of the Basic Principles
In addition to addressing the erroneous decisions in Harmelin, Pulley,
and McCleskey, there are a number of obvious applications of the Eighth 
Amendment that rest on core values and not majoritarian pandering. The 
use of LWOP sentences is an obvious place to begin, with some 
regulation necessary to eliminate the arbitrariness inherent in death-in-
prison sentences.
Further, the Court should abolish JLWOP under the Eighth 
Amendment. Doing so is possible even if the Court continues to use the
                                                                                                                     
191. See Berry & Ryan, supra note 45, at 410.
192. See Berry, supra note 132, at 80.
193. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
194. See William W. Berry III, Normative Retroactivity, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 485, 490 
(2016).
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broken evolving-standards-of-decency doctrine, with a number of states 
outlawing JLWOP and the United States remaining as the only country 
currently using JLWOP.195
Mandatory sentences, particularly ones with long sentences, deserve 
significant scrutiny. As discussed above, such sentences deny analysis of 
proportionality and individualized consideration of offenders. More 
generally, the Court should consider claims of disproportionality in 
sentencing under the Eighth Amendment. In the current regime, 
excessive sentences are common, and contribute significantly to the mass 
incarceration epidemic.
To the extent that the death penalty survives under a more robust 
Eighth Amendment, the safeguards approved in Gregg, including 
comparative proportionality review, serve as minimum requirements. 
Revisiting the Court’s execution-technique jurisprudence would also be 
advisable.
Finally, the Court should use the Eighth Amendment as a tool by 
which to eradicate racism in the criminal justice system, particularly in 
capital cases. At the very least, the Court should put the burden on the 
states to change their practices and combat race discrimination.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence rests on a faulty premise—that state 
punishment practices are entitled to broad deference by the Court. In 
particular, this Article explained how the misreading of “unusual” drives 
the missteps of the evolving-standards-of-decency cases. In addition, this
Article showed how three decisions adhering to this principle—
Harmelin, Pulley, and McCleskey—prevent the Court from applying core 
Eighth Amendment principles to limit disproportionate sentences, 
mandatory sentences, comparatively disproportionate sentences, and 
discriminatory sentences. 
Having demonstrated the Court’s errors, this Article then articulated
a holistic model of the Eighth Amendment that cures these errors. This
Article ended by briefly suggesting some of the many applications of this 
improved jurisprudential model.
                                                                                                                     
195. See Brief for Constance de la Vega et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Miller 
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647).
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